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Abstract
SAR in the Arctic is a complex and dynamic cross-disciplinary activity that requires the combined
effort of multiple actors with specialized human and technical resources. Due to limited resources
and infrastructure in the Arctic, international cooperation is particularly important. This article
applies a conceptual framework drawn from regime-theory to study SAR cooperation in the Arctic.
More specifically, we apply the three dimensions of regime effectiveness (outputs, outcomes
and impacts) to examine the regimes established by the 2011 Arctic SAR Agreement and the
1995 Barents SAR Agreement. The study addresses the rights and duties established by the regimes
and their institutional arrangements for cooperation. Further, it investigates the importance
of operational cooperation among response agencies in understanding the development and
effectiveness of the regimes. The study concludes that the Arctic SAR regime is still under
implementation. The agreement has entered into force but a series of steps needs to be taken for the
common SAR system to be operative. Consequently, the regime is in the early stages of
development and any evaluations of its impact are premature. The parties have implemented the
Barents SAR regime both formally and in practice. Though the regime is generally held to have a
positive effect on cooperation between the parties, there is a range of challenges that raise questions
regarding its capacity to provide for a coordinated and effective joint SAR operation. The study
further concludes that treating regime effectiveness in terms of a causal link between output,
outcome and impact should be done with caution. It also argues that the focus of regime theory on
interest-based decision-making among regime parties should be supplemented by investigating the
operative and informal aspects of cooperation.
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1. Introduction
The need for better search and rescue (SAR) infrastructure and capabilities in the
Arctic is now widely recognized.1 The Arctic is characterized by vast distances, a harsh
climate, limited infrastructure, communication challenges, and sparse population,2
with economic activities traditionally focused on harvesting living marine resources.
Due to climate change, new natural resources have become available for utilization,
and new Arctic regions are opening for commercial activities  including large-
scale plans for petroleum development in the Euro-Arctic regions of Norway3 and
Russia.4 There has also been an increase in maritime traffic related to the petroleum
industry, cruise tourism, and the opening of the Northern Sea Route.5 All this brings a
greater need for inter-Arctic cooperation.6
SAR involves a wide range of technical and human resources, provided by civilian
and public actors, and military agencies. It includes vessels, SAR helicopters,
airplanes and satellite imagery coordinated through various communication plat-
forms. However, resources for SAR operations in the Arctic are limited, in terms of
capacity and the range of current technology.7 Acknowledging that international
cooperation is a prerequisite for effective SAR in the Arctic, the Arctic states have
taken initiatives to collectively strengthen SAR infrastructure.
This article focuses on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in the
Arctic, in particular the Barents region.8 It offers an overview of international law
and agreements pertaining to SAR in the Arctic, and examines two SAR agreements
of special importance to the Arctic: the Arctic SAR Agreement adopted by the
members of the Arctic Council in 2011;9 and the 1995 Barents SAR Agreement
between the Russian government and the Norwegian government on cooperation in
search and rescue in the Barents Sea.10
Previous studies of international SAR in the Arctic have largely focused on the
substantive parts of international agreements, that is, what rights and duties are
establish for the parties.11 Some have addressed how these agreements may influence
the geopolitical interests of States in the Arctic.12 There are also efforts to map the
availability and capacity of technical and human SAR resources in the Arctic.13
However, so far, there has been limited attention paid to the operative cooperation
established by SAR regimes, in terms of establishing a joint emergency response
capacity. There are no academic publications on the Barents SAR regime known to
the authors. This reflects the limited information available on international SAR
cooperation in the Barents Sea. For the Arctic SAR regime, there have been initial
efforts to study its legal and political implications. In both regards, this study
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provides an initial effort to investigate the implementation and effectiveness of SAR
cooperation.
We begin with the substantive rights and duties established regarding SAR in the
Arctic region, asking: what obligations do the agreements establish in terms of the
duty to assist, the level of preparedness required, border-crossing, and other matters
of a substantive nature? We then turn to the operative component  the institutional
arrangements established by the two regimes to facilitate cooperation and coordina-
tion between the parties, through institutionalized decision-making bodies, working-
groups, contingency plans, programs, exercises, in addition to more informal modes
of cooperation.14 Such arrangements may prove crucial to ensuring effective
cooperation and regime development. Thirdly, drawing on reports of exercises and
interviews with SAR professionals, we ask whether there are specific challenges
related to the two agreements that influence effective SAR cooperation. Given the
scope of this study and limited data availability, we cannot provide a comprehensive
study of regime effectiveness.15 Since there have been no joint SAR operations, we
focus on identifying challenges. However, SAR is about the ability of the parties to
provide mutual assistance and to conduct joint operations. This ability is not merely
dependent on political decisions, but relies on the ability of professional responders
with highly specialized functions to coordinate their actions in an effective manner.
The paper argues that when studying regimes whose purpose is to provide for joint
operations, there is a need to move beyond the logic of political interests, as reflected
in the negotiated agreements. Both in terms of regime development and effective-
ness, the operational aspects of the regime (its capacity for joint action) need to be
considered.
After presenting the methods and data of this study, we offer an overview of the
existing international regulatory framework established for SAR in the Arctic.
Empirical sections which focus on the Arctic SAR Agreement and Barents SAR
Agreement follow. We conclude with a discussion of challenges regarding the
performance of the two agreements.
2. Studying International Regimes
Both the Arctic and Barents SAR Agreements can be regarded as establishing
international regimes, i.e. ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles,
norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interaction of actors in a
specific issue area.’16 Regimes consist of a substantive component (principles, norms,
rules) to direct the cooperation of the parties, and an operative component
(procedures and programs) to direct practical and ongoing cooperation among the
parties.17 This article deals with both components of the Arctic and Barents SAR
Agreements.
There is a general focus in regime theory on how cooperation is both based on and
influences the political interests of the parties.18 Following this approach, effective-
ness becomes a matter of achieving common interests through cooperation based on
the regime in question. It is often assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that political
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interest is the determining driving force in the cooperation of the parties and the
evolution of the regime. This commonly takes place through established decision-
making bodies established by the regime. More recently, focus has also turned to the
role of epistemic communities and/or professions as driving forces in regime
development and effectiveness.19 This type of cooperation is often at the operational
level of the regime. It may also play an important role in determining both the
development and effectiveness of international regimes, in particular when con-
sidering regimes such as SAR, where the aim is to establish joint operations.
This implies moving from the merely formal outputs of cooperation, and
discussing the effectiveness of a regime’s output, outcome and impact. What we
want to observe in this case are the coordinated efforts of parties to provide for
effective SAR within the mandate area.
Establishing reliable indicators for regime effectiveness is a challenge.20 In this
particular case, there are no objective standards for evaluation. Our assessments are
therefore based on qualitative data from evaluation reports from training exercises
and interview data. The effectiveness of the regimes will be discussed based on their
outputs, outcomes, and impacts.21 Outputs reflects the rules and regulations
established by the constituting agreements, in addition to the formal measures taken
to move them from paper to practice, both internationally and domestically.22 In
general, it is conceived that regime effectiveness may be dependent on the
requirements established by the rules regulating the parties.23 Outcomes denotes
behavioral changes caused by the implementation of the regime,24 including the
parties’ compliance to the regime.25 Impacts refers to the problem-solving capacity
of a regime26 or the ability to achieve its purpose.27 For a full picture of regime
effectiveness, one would wish to include all indicators of regime effectiveness.
However, moving from one indicator of regime effectiveness to the next is not
without challenges:
‘. . . studying outputs is usually a necessary starting point, but this needs to be supplemented
with studies of outcomes to enable a better grasp on what is happening in practice. Impact
indicators are so demanding in terms of methodology that they are difficult to apply in
empirical studies’.28
Nevertheless, these indicators provide a useful analytical framework for discussing
the development and effectiveness of the cases in this study.
3. Methods
The study builds largely on document studies: international conventions; the two
above-mentioned Agreements; reports from the parties to the agreements; presenta-
tions and reports from the Arctic Council Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response (EPPR) Working Group and Senior Arctic Officials Meetings; training
exercise evaluation reports; and secondary literature where available. These provide a
basis for examining the procedures and practices established by the Agreements,
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developments under the Agreements, and challenges highlighted in exercise
evaluation reports.
In addition, a series of anonymized, semi-structured interviews was conducted.29
As publicly available data regarding SAR in the Arctic and the Barents region are
limited, these interviews aimed at shedding light on the parties’ experiences,
exploring factors that facilitate or inhibit cooperation/coordination on SAR.
Questions were both fact-oriented and directed at the responders’ individual
experiences and attitudes. Nine interviews were conducted with Norwegian and
Russian representatives of organizations relevant to national and international SAR
in the Arctic. Gathering interview-data regarding Russian SAR proved difficult, so
our study relies on one Russian informant with a central role in the Murmansk
Marine Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). Interviews were conducted in Bodø
and Murmansk in 2015. Three interviews were recorded, with informants’ consent;
notes were taken in the remaining cases. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to
two hours. Two authors participated during four interviews; in the other cases,
a single author conducted the interviews. The recorded interviews were later
transcribed. All interview notes were analyzed and discussed by the three authors.
The transcribed interviews were analyzed by the authors employing directed
qualitative content analysis.30 Interview data were categorized into four main
themes: rights and duties established in accordance with the Agreements; coopera-
tion and coordination platforms; experiences and challenges; and facilitators and
inhibitors. All informants are number-coded (see Table 1) and referred to by number
in the text. The interviews were conducted in English, Norwegian and Russian. Parts
of the transcribed interviews were subsequently translated into English. All quotes
from interviews are the authors’ translations.
In discussing experiences from cooperation, we rely predominantly on document
analysis of the Arctic SAR Agreement. The main source of data on experiences
related to the Barents SAR Agreement were interviews originally conducted under
the framework of the SARINOR project.31 In examining experiences from the
bilateral NorwegianRussian cooperation on SAR, we rely heavily on the views
expressed by representatives from the JRCC and the MRCC. These are the key
Table 1. Informants, by country and organization
Organization Number of informants Code in this paper
Norway
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre of Northern Norway
(JRCC), Bodø
4 INF 14
Joint Headquarters of the Norwegian Armed forces 1 INF 5
Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) 1 INF 6
Norwegian Coast Guard (NCG) 1 INF 7
Ministry of Justice and Public Security 1 INF 8
Russia
Murmansk Marine Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) 1 INF 9
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agencies responsible for implementation of the Barents SAR Agreement; the other
organizations participate in bilateral cooperation mainly through exercises.
While our data make it possible to discuss developments and identify challenges
for cooperation, they cannot provide a basis for a comprehensive study of regime
effectiveness.
4. The international regulatory framework
Several widely recognized international agreements establish the legal international
frameworks for SAR. These legal instruments articulate the international standards
and rules on SAR within which the Arctic and Barents SAR regimes are nested,
and stipulate the rights and duties of the parties relating to SAR as well as steps to be
followed in SAR operations.32
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)
established the basic legal framework for managing all maritime activities including
the Arctic. The LOS Convention establishes the rights and duties of states regarding
zones of jurisdiction, rights to natural resources, and navigation. Notably, it also
requires coastal states to promote, through regional cooperation if necessary, ‘‘the
establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and
rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea.’’33
The 1974 International Convention for the Safety of life at Sea (SOLAS, 1974),
with multiple amendments, is generally regarded as the key international treaty
concerning merchant ship safety.34 The Convention provides a framework of rules,
codes, and procedures regarding the international safety standards for the construc-
tion, machinery, equipment, and operation of ships. In particular, Chapter 5 of the
Convention obliges the masters of a ship at sea ‘‘to proceed with all speed to the
assistance of persons in distress.’’35
The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR
Convention, 1979) establishes the international system covering search and rescue
operations.36 The Convention requires that the parties ensure that arrangements are
made for the provision of adequate SAR services in their coastal waters, including
the establishment of rescue co-ordination centers and sub-centers.37 It encourages
the parties to enter into SAR agreements with neighboring states, provide necessary
assistance, and facilitate coordination during search and rescue operations.38 It
further outlines operating procedures to be followed in the event of emergencies or
alerts and during SAR operations.39 To facilitate search and rescue operations, the
parties are required to establish ship-reporting systems, under which ships report
their position to a coastal radio station.40 Following the 1979 SAR Convention, the
International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee divided the
world’s oceans into 13 SAR areas, in each of which the countries concerned have
delimited search and rescue regions for which they are responsible (see Figure 1).
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention,
1944) established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1947, a
UN specialized agency charged with coordinating and regulating international air
A.K. Sydnes et al
114
travel. The Convention establishes the rights of signatory states over their territorial
airspace, aircraft registration and safety, and lays down basic principles relating to
international transport of dangerous goods by air.41 The International Aeronautical
and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual), developed jointly by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), provides guidelines for a common aviation and maritime
approach to organizing and providing search and rescue services. The manual has
three volumes: on the establishment and improvement of national and regional SAR
systems and international cooperation (Volume I), guidelines for those who plan and
coordinate SAR operations and exercises (Volume II) and guidelines for the conduct
of operations on-scene (Volume III).42
However, the general IMO safety conventions have limitations regarding Arctic
shipping.43 Therefore, the IMO adopted the International Code for Ships Operating
in Polar Waters (the Polar Code) and related amendments to the SOLAS
Convention in November 2014. The Polar Code deals with the full range of design,
construction, equipment, operational, training, SAR and environmental protection
matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the
poles.44 Every ship to which the Polar Code applies shall have a Polar Ship
Figure 1. SAR regions relevant to the Arctic SAR Agreement and the Barents SAR Agreement47
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Certificate, issued by the flag state.45 In addition, every ship shall carry a Polar Water
Operational Manual including risk-based procedures for SAR.46
To specify the existing international framework on SAR activities to local
conditions States enter regional agreements of a more specific nature. In the
following, this study has a focus on the 2011 Arctic SAR Agreement and the 1995
Barents SAR Agreements.
5. 2011 Arctic SAR Agreement
At its 2009 Ministerial Meeting in Tromsø, the Arctic Council decided to establish a
Task Force mandated with developing an international instrument for SAR
cooperation in the Arctic. This resulted in the production of the Agreement on
Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (the
Arctic SAR Agreement). The Agreement was signed by the eight Arctic states48 at
the Nuuk Ministerial meeting in 201149 and entered into force in January 2013.50
The Arctic SAR Agreement is the first legally binding instrument negotiated under
the auspices of the Arctic Council.51 However, it should be noted that several Arctic
bi- and multilateral agreements covering various geographical areas and activities
existed prior to 2011.52 The Arctic SAR Agreement builds on this pre-existing
cooperation,53 and provides a comprehensive pan-Arctic SAR framework.
The Agreement contains 20 Articles, one Annex and three Appendixes that
establish a regional mechanism for international cooperation on SAR in the Arctic.
The Appendixes provide an overview (APPENDIX I - Competent Authorities,
APPENDIX II - Search and Rescue Agencies, APPENDIX III - Rescue Coordina-
tion Centers) of the specific authorities of each party responsible for different aspects
of SAR operations and related activities. These Appendixes are of an informative
nature and parties can unilaterally alter the information in the appendixes as long
as they inform the other parties.54 The Appendixes correspond to the three layers
of the SAR decision-making hierarchy where ‘‘competent authorities’’ represent the
political level, ‘‘agencies’’ are government units with a specific functional and/or
territorial competence, and ‘‘rescue coordination centers’’ are the units which have
overall operational responsibility during SAR operations.55 Providing a clear
hierarchy and an overview of the specific national agencies responsible for SAR is
important particularly due to the large number of national ministries, agencies and
other units participating in SAR activities. The aim is to streamline communication,
which is commonly regarded an ongoing challenge during SAR operations. The
objective of the Agreement is to further ‘‘strengthen aeronautical and maritime
search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic’’ (Art. 2). The
geographical scope is specified in the Annex. Each member-state is responsible for a
particular SAR area, in accordance with the 1979 SAR Convention (see Figure 1).
These areas are ‘‘not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any
boundary between States or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.’’56
Within their areas, the members are to ‘promote the establishment, operation and
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maintenance of an adequate and effective’ SAR capability.57 Further, each party
commits to nominating specific national authorities that will have full discretion in
the field of SAR in its area. These national authorities are required not only to take
efficient measures, but also to notify other relevant national authorities when
appropriate. The competent authorities of the parties, agencies responsible for
search and rescue, and rescue coordination centers are outlined in Articles 4 through
6 and specified in the Appendixes.
The Arctic SAR Agreement was concluded in accordance with the 1979 SAR
Convention and the 1944 Chicago Convention,58 which ‘‘shall be used as the basis
for conducting search and rescue operations under this Agreement.’’59 The IAMSAR
Manual provides additional guidelines on implementing the Arctic SAR Agree-
ment.60 These three sources establish the basic framework and provide explicit
procedures for conducting SAR operations. Without prejudice to the provisions of
the SAR and Chicago Conventions, Article 7 of the Arctic SAR Agreement lays
down provisions for the conduct of aeronautical and maritime SAR operations;
provides that ‘‘parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in
distress,’’ and also specifies the procedures for forwarding information and the
request for assistance. Importantly, parties that have been requested to provide
assistance shall promptly determine whether they are capable of providing assistance,
and on which terms.61 The Agreement does not specify the resources that parties are
obliged to provide: ‘‘[i]mplementation of this Agreement shall be subject to the
availability of relevant resources,’’62 and all costs related to it are to be paid by the
individual parties.63 Thus, it is up to the individual state to decide on the appropriate
level of resources designated to SAR under the Agreement. Further, the Agreement
specifies that SAR operations shall not prejudice the sovereignty of the coastal
state(s).64 The parties must ‘‘request permission to enter the territory of a Party
or Parties for search and rescue purposes.’’65 Importantly, the party receiving a
request for entry into its territory shall apply ‘‘the most expeditious border crossing
procedure possible.’’66
Article 9 of the Agreement lays down provisions for the development of cooperation
among the parties, stipulating that the parties ‘‘shall enhance cooperation among
themselves in matters relevant to this Agreement’’ (para 1). This includes information
exchange ‘‘to improve the effectiveness of search and rescue operations’’ (para 2)
Such information may concern communication details, information about SAR
facilities, overview of available airfields and ports together with their refueling and
resupply capabilities, information on fueling, supply and medical facilities and
information important for training SAR personnel (para 2). The Agreement offers a
comprehensive overview of possible collaborative efforts to facilitate mutual SAR
cooperation. These include: exchange of experience; sharing information on mete-
orological and oceanographic observations; exchange of SAR personnel; arranging
joint exercises and training; using ship reporting systems for SAR purposes; sharing
information systems, SAR procedures, techniques, equipment and facilities; provid-
ing service support of SAR operations; sharing national positions on SAR issues;
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supporting and implementing joint research and development initiatives; and
conducting regular communications checks and exercises (para 3).
In addition to information exchange and the promotion of general collaborative
efforts, the Agreement directs the parties to conduct meetings on a regular basis ‘‘to
consider and resolve issues regarding practical cooperation.’’67 The purpose of these
meetings is to address issues related to reciprocal visits by SAR experts and their
participation in the parties’ national SAR exercise as observers, conducting joint
exercises and training. The meetings should also address the development of
cooperation under the Agreement; the planning, development, and use of commu-
nication systems; review and improvement of international guidelines on SAR in the
Arctic; and review of relevant guidance on Arctic meteorological services.68 Further,
the parties are encouraged to ‘‘conduct a joint review of the operation led by the
Party that coordinated the operation.’’69
Any amendment to the Agreement is to be undertaken by written agreement of all
the parties.70 However, any two parties with adjacent SAR regions may, by mutual
agreement, amend information on the delimitation of SAR regions relevant to the
Agreement contained in paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement setting forth the
delimitation between those regions.71 Further, individual Parties may amend
information related to the areas of application of the Agreement specified by
paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement, provided that this does not affect the
area of any other Party.72 The Agreement offers direct negotiations as a means of
settling all disputes between the parties related to the Agreement.73 Any party may at
any time withdraw from the Agreement, following written notification to the
depository through diplomatic channels at least six months in advance of the
effective date of its withdrawal.74
5.1. Developments under the Arctic SAR Agreement
5.1.1. Cooperation of the parties
Emergency Preparedness, Prevention and Response (EPPR) is one of the Arctic
Council’s six Working Groups. Its main task is to facilitate international cooperation
on issues related to the prevention, preparedness and response to all kinds of
environmental emergencies in the Arctic. The working group meets twice annually,
and has a two-year rotating Chairmanship and a secretariat. It focuses on collecting
sufficient and reliable data to underpin scientific recommendations that aid the
member-states in establishing national-level procedures.75 Since 2015, SAR issues
have been part of the EPPR working mandate. This includes the planning, execution
and reporting of SAR activities with follow-up on the Arctic SAR Agreement and
addressing relevant findings from SAR exercises.76
The EPPR does not have an operational mandate for SAR (i.e., for participating in
actual SAR operations), as that is the responsibility of the member-states. However,
the EPPR offers recommendations and information within the Arctic Council and to
others and advises the Senior Arctic Officials on relevant SAR incidents and events.77
It supports the Arctic SAR Agreement by addressing relevant lessons learned from
SAR exercises and real incidents, and by maintaining a repository of lessons learned
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and best practices of Arctic SAR incidents and events.78 The EPPR functions as a
coordinating body on SAR issues within the Arctic Council, and is to facilitate the
implementation of the Arctic SAR Agreement by ‘‘focusing on enhancing coopera-
tion, highlighting best practices, exchanging information, analyzing results of
exercises, and sharing lessons learned.’’79
The establishment of the EPPR Search and Rescue Expert Group (SAR EG) in
201580 is one recent development under the EPPR. This expert group has a strategic
focus; its main task is to follow up the implementation of paras. 9 and 10 of the
Arctic SAR Agreement on Cooperation and Meetings of the Parties.81 The group
held its first meeting during the EPPR Working Group meeting, June 1315, 2016,
in Montreal, Canada.82 The mandate of the group was finalized and approved by the
EPPR in December 2016 during the working group meeting in Copenhagen.83 The
SAR EG has no operational mandate and reports to the EPPR as a guiding body.84
The expert group is a facilitator whose duty is to support existing fora that deal with
Arctic SAR issues ‘‘by leveraging high level engagement from government and
scientific institutions’’.85 Its specific goal is ‘‘to identify key lessons of Arctic incidents
and exercises and communicate/disseminate effective practices and necessary
mitigation or remedial actions to the ministerial level, Member States and other
relevant international bodies’’.86
The EPPR is also to develop collaboration with the newly established International
Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF). In 2015, the eight Arctic nations signed a joint
statement establishing ACGF as ‘‘an operationally focused, consensus-based
organization that leverages collective resources to foster safe, secure, and envir-
onmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.’’87 The Forum will support
the work of the EPPR Working Group by providing an additional platform for
cooperation on operational issues, including search and rescue.88 However, the
mandate of the ACGF in relation to the 2013 MOSPA Agreement89 and the Arctic
SAR Agreement is unclear; the EPPR is working to clarify this, inter alia to avoid
overlaps.90
5.1.2. Experiences from exercises
The main source of data for evaluating the Arctic SAR Agreement since its
establishment in 2011 are reports from joint exercises. A series of tabletop and live
full-scale exercises has been conducted under the Arctic SAR Agreement to date.91
Here we focus on the main findings of the available evaluation reports.
The first exercise organized in accordance with the Arctic SAR Agreement was a
tabletop one, held in Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada in 2011. The exercise focused on
strategic and operational aspects of aeronautical and maritime SAR in the Arctic and
provided the first opportunity to discuss the implementation of the Arctic SAR
Agreement.92 The parties exchanged information on national SAR capabilities;
discussions examined Arctic SAR scenarios that would require international
cooperation and resources.93
The Danish Defense hosted SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, the first full-scale live
SAR exercise under the Arctic SAR Agreement. It was held off the east coast of
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Greenland, and involved a disaster scenario with a medium-sized (160 passengers
and crew) cruise ship, including an open sea search operation (simulating a mass
rescue operation on a cruise ship) and an in-fjord rescue and evacuation operation.94
The aim was to involve the ‘‘Arctic Nations’ SAR organizations and associated
authorities and their capabilities in a live exercise . . . in a remote Arctic environ-
ment,’’ testing communications, equipment and procedures nationally and between
the participating nations.95 Fundamentally, the exercise revealed that the Arctic SAR
regime as an emergency response system needed to improve its procedures for
cooperation and communication and establish a common understanding on how to
apply them. The evaluation report identified several more specific challenges, and
provided a series of detailed recommendations for the search and rescue phases of SAR
operations. In focus here were the lack of adequate planning for evacuation opera-
tions, a lack of personnel, coordination problems among emergency medical units,
and malfunctions of crisis communication at various levels.96 SAREX 2012 was
valuable in identifying gaps in the operative SAR system  while also showing that the
challenges were numerous.
SAREX 2013 was conducted on the initiative of Denmark/Greenland to address
the challenges identified by SAREX Greenland Sea 2012.97 Due to the short planning
cycle, a modified version of SAREX 2012 was used as a scenario. The results of the
exercise were generally considered positive. Nevertheless, the evaluation report offers
various recommendations on search operations (including means and methods of
communication, use of a common log system, search for life rafts from ships, and
strengthening the manning of the Joint Arctic Command) and rescue operations
(including communication, criminal investigation, rescue teams and safety).98
In October 2015, the Arctic Zephyr 2015 tabletop exercise was held, hosted by
the US authorities.99 The scenario was a mass rescue operation to test coordination
and command and control among the Arctic nations’ mission partners and rele-
vant stakeholders at various levels.100 Several observations and recommendations
were made regarding cooperation and coordination under the Agreement.101 Areas of
primary concern included communications, situational awareness, resources, logis-
tical support, strategic messaging and media, and coordination and planning.102
Importantly, the exercise called into question the effectiveness of the regime
established by the Arctic SAR Agreement as such. Specifically, the exercise evaluation
report underlined that the Agreement does not provide an effective process or
mechanism for achieving Article 9 on Cooperation among the Parties and Article 10,
Meetings of the Parties. In addition, recognized or codified methods for the co-
ordination of operational SAR activities were lacking, as were standardized processes
for sharing lessons learned. The report emphasized that the mere signing of the
Arctic SAR Agreement cannot ensure effective cooperation and coordination among
the Parties. These must be strengthened by institutionalizing processes through the
EPPR Working Group, conducting adequate exercises, and involving relevant
participants, including industry.103
Building on the Arctic Zephyr tabletop exercise series, Arctic Chinook was held in
Kotzebue, Alaska, August 2225, 2016. This exercise was hosted by the USA and
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organized by the US Coast Guard and the US Northern Command. The scenario
involved a mass maritime rescue operation in the Arctic from an adventure-class
cruise ship that experienced an incident which developed into a catastrophic
event.104 A large full-scale SAR exercise is planned for February/March 2019. The
exercise will be coordinated by the Finnish Border Guard. As a rehearsal for this
exercise, a SAR module will be included in the full scale oil recovery exercise
conducted under the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (the MOSPA Agreement) scheduled to take
place in Finland in February 2018.105
In summary, the Arctic SAR Agreement is a legally binding pan-Arctic agreement
that aims to build on the existing international framework and established regional
SAR agreements. Its member-states are to promote the establishment of national
SAR capabilities within their national SAR areas. The Agreement has established
procedures for requesting SAR assistance, border-crossings, and information sharing
between the parties, among other things. Since 2011, the EPPR has, first informally
and later as part of its mandate, facilitated member-state cooperation. Since 2015
this cooperation has also been facilitated through a SAR Expert Group. Operative
collaboration of the parties is developing gradually on the basis of a series of joint
exercises, which have also uncovered a range of challenges that must be addressed if
the regime is to provide for efficient joint SAR operations.
6. The 1995 Barents SAR Agreement
Norway and Russia have collaborated on SAR at sea since 1956. In 1988, the 1956
agreement on search and rescue at sea between Norway and the Soviet Union was
replaced by a more comprehensive agreement.106 The latter was, in turn, replaced by
the existing bilateral Barents SAR Agreement of 1995 between Norway and Russia.
This Agreement bases its framework for activity on the 1979 International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR Convention, 1979), to which
both Norway and Russia are parties. The Barents SAR Agreement does not influence
the rights and duties of the parties according to other bi- or multilateral agreements.
The IAMSAR manual provides guidelines for operative implementation of the
Agreement.
The Barents SAR Agreement contains 12 Articles and an Appendix that clarifies
communication channels and procedures. The main norm is that the parties shall
provide assistance in search and rescue in the Barents Sea.107 The Agreement sets
the conditions for joint operations, the provision of assistance, and clarifies how
requests for assistance are to be forwarded:
The SAR services of the Party that receives a message that someone is missing or in
distress in the Barents Sea, shall instantly take those measures considered most
appropriate to organize and initiate a SAR operation. The Party’s SAR services that
receive such a message may, to ensure that necessary assistance is provided as
quickly as possible, instantly contact the other Party’s SAR services so that the
planning, coordination and conduct of the SAR operation shall be done in
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consultation between them. The Party’s SAR services that have initiated a SAR
operation, can request the other Party’s SAR services for assistance if it considers it
necessary for the operation to be conducted.108
Further, the SAR services of two parties are to provide mutual assistance to the
extent they have the appropriate resources to do so.109
Article 2 of the Agreement specifies the competent national authorities responsible
for the organization and coordination of activities to search for missing persons and
rescue people suffering distress in the Barents Sea, and the tasks of these authorities:
the Marine Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) in Murmansk, Russia and the
Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) North Norway. Its Article 5 clarifies how
requests on border crossing related to SAR operations are to be forwarded: Requests
for rescue units to enter the territorial waters and airspace should be directed to the
responsible rescue services of the other party. All necessary information should be
provided by the party entering the other’s jurisdiction. The request for entry should
be handled as quickly as the situation requires; once granted, information is to be
provided regarding the rules and conditions that apply. Rescue units entering the
territorial waters or airspace of the other party are to establish communications with
the latter’s rescue coordination center and follow its requests.
The Agreement obliges the parties to provide and share information that is of
considerable importance for the fulfillment of the Agreement (Art. 7). It clarifies the
means and channels of communication with reference to international standards and
establishes English as the language of communication (Art.8; Appendix). The
Parties agree to inform each other promptly, and further assist in obtaining necessary
information on vessels or aircrafts belonging to the other Party that are missing or in
distress (Art. 6).
The Agreement does not establish any organizational body, but it encourages the
parties to conduct joint meetings when needed to ‘‘discuss or facilitate practical
measures relating to cooperation in the search of missing persons and rescue of
people in distress in the Barents Sea’’ and joint training exercises.110 In accordance
with the Agreement, an annual joint Exercise Barents is to be conducted between
Norway and Russia. From 2006, Exercise Barents has covered exercises under both
the Barents SAR Agreement and the 1994 NorwegianRussian Oil Spill Response
regime.111 The main objective of Exercise Barents is to ‘‘exercise the cooperation
between MRCC Murmansk and JRCC North Norway related to SAR and rescue
units on scene.’’112 In connection with Exercise Barents, two meetings are conducted
between Norway and Russia each year. One is to evaluate the previous year’s exercise
and plan for the current year. The second is a pre-exercise meeting held two days
ahead of the annual exercise to focus on communication, cooperation, safety on
scene, and confirmation of earlier agreed-upon resources and objectives for the
exercise.113
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6.1. Experiences from cooperation
Joint NorwegianRussian SAR cooperation has developed over the years, largely
through the meetings of the parties in relation to the joint exercises under the
Agreement. Even though ‘‘progress in this cooperation has been slow, every step . . .
has taken a lot of time and a lot of preparation and discussions . . ..’’,114 most of our
informants agree that cooperation has gradually developed and improved over the
course of time.115 A representative from JRCC gave the following explanation:
It’s a different kind of cooperation with Russia than with the others. Not that it is
problematic, but progress has been slow. We had issues with language, bureaucracy
and stuff, but I think the reason why we still keep at it is that we see progress. . . .
[I]f you go back 10 or 15 years, people were asking - Is it really worth putting so
much effort and money into this cooperation and these exercises? Do they really
result in anything valuable?’’ And the answer from us was: ‘‘Yes, it is important’’. . . .
It varies a bit from year to year. Sometimes there were people . . . who were not so
interested when we met with them for the planning . . .. But our main partner,
MRCC [Murmansk Rescue Coordination Center], has always been positive to this
cooperation.116
At the informal level, there seems to have developed a degree of trust between
participants. ‘‘There has been a good spirit of cooperation on both sides. . . . We can
learn from each other . . . Mutual learning, it adds to the level of competence.’’117
‘‘We have had good cooperation for a long time.’’118 In contrast to the global and
regional agreements, the bilateral Barents Agreement ‘‘makes this cooperation more
detailed, more adjusted to the local situation between the two countries, it commits
the parties a bit more. . .’’119 Moreover, the frequency of communication between the
parties has increased over the years.120 In addition to daily activities, there are weekly
communication checks.121 ‘‘[T]here is continuous progress in the relationship with
the Norwegians. To start with, communication was rather rare, but it has become
more and more frequent every year. Communicating with the same people creates
predictability, you know what to expect from the person.’’122
The bilateral training exercises have proven a key facilitator of cooperation, and our
informants agree that the exercises have been the main factor for success.123 Initially,
the bilateral exercises were held on a smaller scale. However, the task complexity,
the levels and amounts of resources involved have increased substantially.124 Though
most informants highlight the positive impacts of the bilateral training exercises, a
representative of the Norwegian Joint Headquarters made several critical points
regarding Exercise Barents.125 This informant held that scenarios have been
unrealistic in terms of weather conditions and the close proximity of incidents to
land, with ready access to SAR resources; further, the informant pointed out that
Russian SAR participation was limited to rescuing someone at predefined coordinates
and with all necessary resources available. Thus, the exercises have done little to test
the actual capacity and availability of SAR resources and thereby identify gaps. The
primary value this informant saw in conducting Exercise Barents was to maintain
communication between Norwegian and Russian participants. Another informant  a
representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security  commented
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that ‘‘challenges emerge’’ in cooperation, that ‘‘exercises can be a bit challenging’’ and
‘‘language and culture are a clear barrier’’  while stressing that ‘‘our experience is that
the cooperation with Russia is very good.’’126
One shortcoming of the exercises is the absence of a joint formal evaluation
procedure. After Exercise Barents, the parties have a common debriefing session, but
there is no joint formal evaluation report following the exercise. Apart from the
planning and pre-exercise meetings, no other regular meetings are held by the parties.
Communication is limited to some day-to-day contact between the Joint Rescue
Coordination Center (JRCC) in Bodø and Marine Rescue Coordination Center in
Murmansk.
The absence of a joint evaluation procedure is due to the lack of capacity and
funding.127 However, a common evaluation could make the cooperation more
effective.128 The post-exercise debriefing sessions have now become the main arena
for discussing experiences. Previously there was little discussion and criticism during
debriefing, whereas now ‘‘[w]e trust each other more and can speak more freely.’’129
When learning processes rely heavily on informal procedures, much will often
depend on participant continuity, which has largely been stable. However, learning
will not always disseminate among the participating actors  MRCC, JRCC, coast
guards, coastal administrations, navies etc.  if procedures are not formalized.
From interviews and reports, challenges have been identified related to SAR
cooperation under the agreement. Border-crossing procedures for SAR resources is
one such issue.130 Border-crossing is important for the effectiveness of any joint SAR
operation and is on the agenda during the exercise every year. Our Russian informant
noted that ‘‘[w]hile getting permission [for border-crossing] could take hours before,
now it only takes minutes.’’131 However, the JRCC report on Exercise Barents 2014
emphasizes that ‘‘sometimes border crossing clearance of vessels is not possible,
[which] might challenge the search pattern planning procedure.’’132 Representatives
of the JRCC underline that the situation has improved but remains an issue:133 ‘‘We fill
in the forms and send them to the Russian side and it varies. That’s the problem. One
year we get an answer within 15 minutes, the next year it takes 6 hours. The Russians
say they need to wait for clearance from Moscow. The problem for us is that this varies
a lot, differs from year to year, and it is hard to find out what the real problem is.’’134
Our Norwegian informants also perceive it as a problem that they are not provided
with an overview of resources on the Russian side regarding where they are based,
their availability, how they can contribute.135 As one Norwegian informant pointed
out: ‘‘We have tried for many, many years to . . . either get a map or a list or whatever.
We have provided [information] on all of the Norwegian helicopters and vessels . . .,
where they are normally, but they have never given us anything,’’ which creates a
sense of unpredictability and has implications for planning.136 It was noted that one
explanation made by Russian partners is that the Russian authorities are reluctant to
share information regarding SAR resources that are under military command.137
The lack of information regarding available SAR resources is obviously an impe-
diment to the effectiveness of joint SAR operations in terms of planning, mobilizing,
and coordinating all available units and resources.
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The language barrier used to be a substantial obstacle to effective communication
and cooperation.138 Russia then started including English-speaking crewmembers on
vessels. In addition, most controllers at the MRCC now speak English.139 As noted by
a Norwegian informant: ‘‘It’s no problem for us today, I can pick up the phone, call
Murmansk, most of them can speak English, it’s kind of an easy cooperation  yes, the
Agreement works in that respect.’’140 Consequently, the ‘‘language issue’’ has impro-
ved in recent years,141 but language is still considered a problem,142 particularly on site.143
Finally, some Norwegian informants noted that cooperation has sometimes relied
on Norwegian resources called upon by MRCC or directly by Russian vessels.144
The reason given was that Russian resources are often not available when needed.145
As a representative from JRCC noted:
What we experienced a few years ago was that more and more Russian vessels
contacted us even though they knew they were in the Russian area. . . . The rumors
spread that if you contact Bodø you will get help. . . . We tried to transfer all of these
to Murmansk. We use the system as it’s supposed to be used. . . . We don’t want to
make a system where everybody contacts Norway wherever they are, because that
undermines Russia.146
Such cases commonly involve requests for assistance from Norwegian SAR heli-
copters to assist Russian fishing vessels in distress, or in airlifting Russian fishermen
who are ill or injured and need hospital care. They are not, as such, requests for
assistance in joint SAR operations, which is the proper scope of the Barents SAR
regime. However, it is likely that such day-to-day communication, and cooperation
through the joint Barents SAR regime, have a mutually positive effect in maintaining
dialogue and contacts.
Interestingly, Norwegian informants varied as regards the extent to which they
trusted the effectiveness of the regime, and whether it would respond during actual
SAR incidents. As one informant put it:
It’s not a problem for me to either call or send an e-mail to Murmansk to raise an
issue if we find something problematic . . . or if we need to discuss anything. That’s
easy and it’s of course due to the cooperation we have had all these years, that we
have built up a kind of trust in each other. We know each other and we are able to
communicate in a positive way.147
And, according to another: ‘‘We feel confident that we can cooperate. We know
whom to call. We know what they have more or less’’148. However, two JRCC
representatives said they were uncertain whether assistance would be forthcoming
from Russia during a SAR operation.149 This uncertainty, regarding both the
Russians’ capacity and ability to provide assistance during SAR operations, is of
course a crucial point in assessing the effectiveness of the Barents SAR regime.
Similar doubts were not expressed on the Russian side, which, as noted above, has
relied on Norwegian assistance.
The Barents SAR Agreement is, as noted, a bilateral agreement with a relatively
limited scope, based on the pre-existing international framework. It has established
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procedures for requesting SAR assistance, border-crossings and information sharing
between the parties. No formal decision-making body has been established under the
Agreement. However, the joint meetings in connection with the annual Exercise
Barents have provided an important arena for raising and resolving issues regarding
SAR cooperation, both formally and informally. Over time, the operative coopera-
tion of the parties has also developed, based on the annual Exercise Barents and the
regular contacts between the JRCC and the MRCC. As such, development of the
cooperation is largely based on operative aspects of the agreement, through joint
planning meetings and exercises.
7. Challenges and effectiveness
When assessing the performance of the Arctic and Barents SAR regimes there are no
clear-cut answers that stand out. Through investigating the regimes’ paths of
development and the challenges they face, we seek a nuanced understanding of the
cooperation between the parties. When discussing the effectiveness of the Arctic and
Barents SAR regimes we return to the analytical distinction between regimes
outputs, outcomes and impact.150
In terms of regime outputs, the parties to the Arctic and the Barents SAR regimes
have taken initial steps to make the regimes operational. The agreements enter into
force as they are adopted and ratified by the parties. Both the Arctic SAR Agreement
and the Barents SAR Agreement are based on, and nested within, well-established
and widely recognized sources of international law: the 1979 SAR Convention,
the 1944 Chicago Convention, the IAMSAR Manual, and UNCLOS 1982. The
parties have acted in line with their international commitments by establishing
specific SAR Agreements for the Arctic and Barents regions as the perceived need
for such arrangements has developed. The Arctic and Barents SAR Agreements
both establish procedures for cooperation, rights and duties, and not least mutual
expectations regarding joint SAR operations within their mandate areas. However,
the Arctic SAR Agreement has generated no new formal requirements/legal
obligations for the parties, instead reaffirming the commitments of the Arctic states
to the international regulatory framework. The same can be said for the Barents SAR
Agreement. For example, both Agreements make it clear that the duty to assist and
the levels of resources committed in a joint operation are subject to the availability of
relevant resources. At the operational level, both regimes follow the established
international framework which is already in place and governs SAR operations  in
particular the IAMSAR Manual. As such, the two agreements do not add more
stringency or new demands that could contribute to the effectiveness of the two
regimes.151
Regime outcomes are related to the implementation of a regime and the extent to
which it leads to behavioral changes.152 In general, the parties to the regimes seem to
have a will to act upon the obligations established by the constituting agreements.
However, there are challenges that need to be resolved both to facilitate cooperation
and to promote behavioral changes. The Arctic and Barents SAR regimes do not
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establish any independent organizational capacity, such as a secretariat with a
dedicated personnel and budget. In the case of the Barents regime, this is to be
provided by the two member-countries and their national authorities. In the case of
the Arctic regime, this responsibility to some extent falls under the EPPR. The Arctic
SAR regime has established the advisory SAR Expert Group under EPPR. The
Barents SAR regime has an established planning group. However, neither regime has
a formal decision-making body that meets on a regular basis with the mandate to
make decisions on behalf of the parties. The SAR Expert Group was established to
promote, advise and assist the cooperation of the parties, not to make decisions. This
was determined after an evaluation of Arctic Zephyr in 2015, where it was concluded
that the parties were not acting upon their obligations to conduct meetings and
cooperate under the Arctic SAR Agreement’s articles 9 and 10. As for the Barents
regime, it has established a planning group in relation to the annual Exercise Barents,
but that planning group is not mandated to make decisions on behalf of the member-
states. As such, both regimes seem to have limited the capacity of members to make
joint decisions to further cooperation.
The operative component of the Barents SAR Agreement appears stronger than
that of the Arctic SAR Agreement, as the procedures established (joint training
exercises and meetings of the exercise planning group) are up and running on a
regular basis. Here the time difference should be recalled: the Barents SAR
Agreements dates back to 1995, whereas the Arctic SAR Agreement was not
concluded until 2011 and is still in the process of developing operative procedures.
For both the Arctic and the Barents SAR regimes, exercises seem to be the
centerpiece of practical cooperation. Exercises held in connection with the Arctic
SAR regime are pivotal for mapping gaps and developing procedures and arrange-
ments for its response systems to become functional. Without the exercises, the
Arctic SAR Agreement would not have moved beyond being a ‘‘dead letter.’’ For the
Barents SAR regime, all institutional arrangements focus on the annual exercises,
and cooperation based on these planning meetings and exercises are what provides
regime dynamics. A strong sense of trust and professional understanding has
developed between the participants in the planning group. This has been an
important factor for the positive development of the regime, in terms of dealing
with practical and operational aspects of cooperation. However, the joint exercises of
the regimes have also identified a range of challenges for operative cooperation.
There has been criticism of the Norwegian-Russian bilateral exercises in that they do
little to test the actual capacity of responders and the availability of SAR resources. In
addition, the Barents SAR regime does not have joint evaluation procedures after
exercises. Despite the parties’ positive dialogue and trust during debriefs, this
impedes the mutual learning processes from joint operations and eventually the
effectiveness of the regime.
All the Arctic states, parties to both regimes, are developing their national SAR
capacities. Nevertheless, both regimes lag behind in terms of available SAR capacity
within their mandate areas  not surprising, given the substantial increase in activity
in the Arctic in recent decades. However, there is an acknowledged need to expand
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the capacity to conduct SAR operations. For the Barents regime, our study has
shown that the Norwegian authorities have limited knowledge of Russian resources
and their availability, or Russian procedures on notification and mobilization. For the
Arctic regime, there is also a need to map available SAR resources among the parties.
As such, there is limited insight in the actual SAR capacities available.
For the Barents SAR regime, problems also remain regarding the border-crossing
procedures of SAR resources, in particular on the Russian side. This is a crucial issue
that must be dealt with in connection with any large-scale international SAR
operation that requires the mobilization of resources covered by the agreements.
As the Barents and Arctic regions are geopolitically sensitive, and military units
frequently the most readily available resources during SAR operations (planes,
vessels, helicopters), this may also prove to be a challenge in the future. Notably, the
main challenges related to information sharing and border crossing are not due to the
participating actors involved in the cooperation. Border crossing may be hampered
by national border authorities that do not participate in cooperation though the SAR
regimes. In addition, information sharing regarding military units used in SAR
operations may be considered sensitive information by military authorities. This is
not surprising considering that both regimes include members of NATO and Russia.
Finally, language is still a barrier regarding communication. Although the situation is
improving, it has been reported by informants and in evaluation reports.
Regimes’ impact, that is, their problem-solving capacities, is subject to a great deal
of uncertainty. Analytically, Andresen states that establishing indicators for regime
impacts is riddled with uncertainties.153 In the case of the regimes analyzed here,
impact would imply some measure of the regimes’ ability to conduct a joint response
in a coordinated and effective manner. This study is largely based on the experiences
of cooperation through joint exercises, and in the case of the Barents SAR regime,
joint SAR operations. Based on the empirical findings in this study, one may
conclude that the Barents SAR regime’s impact is uncertain, while the Arctic SAR
regime’s score is low. One simple explanation is related to capacity - the human
and technical SAR resources available. It is widely recognized that SAR capacity
in the Arctic is low. In addition, there is uncertainty regarding the available
capacity between different Arctic States, in particular Russia. Finally, the operational
procedures, e.g. for communication and border-crossing, need to be formally
established and predictable. In sum, this leads to uncertainties regarding the ability
of the parties to the regimes to conduct joint SAR operations in an effective manner
within their respective mandate areas, the purpose for which they were established.
8. Conclusions
SAR in the Arctic are complex operations involving a wide range of actors with
specialized human and technical resources. Due to the limited resources and
infrastructure available, international cooperation is a prerequisite to provide for
SAR in the Arctic. We have analyzed two established regimes in the region, the Arctic
and Barents SAR regimes, by applying analytical concepts for analyzing regime
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effectiveness. In doing so we have distinguished between the outputs, outcomes and
impacts of the regimes. Further, we have focused on the experiences of cooperation
and developments of the regimes, focusing not only on political dimensions of
cooperation, but also on experiences of operative cooperation.
We conclude that the Arctic SAR regime is still under implementation. A
constituting agreement has been negotiated and entered into force. However, a
series of steps need to be taken to ensure that the regime leads to behavioral changes
among the parties. This includes institutionalized cooperation through the regular
meetings of parties, and the development of principles, rules and procedures for
operational cooperation. Efforts are being undertaken by the parties in that regard,
including the establishment of the SAR Expert Group and conducting joint
exercises. However, these processes are likely to take time to develop. Consequently,
it is premature to discuss the problem-solving capacity of the Arctic SAR regime at
this point of time.
For the Barents SAR regime, the parties have developed their cooperation over
time, through exercises and SAR operations. The constituting agreement is based on
the established legal framework and acted upon by the parties. Through experience
with operative cooperation, the regime has had a gradually increasing positive effect
on the behavior of the parties. This has both been through formal modes of
cooperation and more informal relations developed between the participating
responders and agencies. However, informants are divided in their views regarding
whether the regime is capable of handling joint SAR operations in a sharp situation.
This is largely due to uncertainties regarding the availability of SAR resources in
Russia and complications related to border-crossings.
Our findings call for caution in treating effectiveness in terms of a causal link
between output, outcome and impact, where one is the starting-point for analyzing
the following stages.154 In particular regarding the stringency and level of demands
placed on the parties as a starting point for an analysis of effectiveness,155 which does
not appear to be fruitful in these cases. Rather, operational cooperation, with a focus
on exercises, seem to be the centerpiece of the two regimes. One consequence is that
the political dimension of cooperation, through an institutionalized decision-making
body, seems to be of lesser importance in the development of the regimes. This is
particularly the case for the Barents SAR regime, but it also applies to the Arctic SAR
regime. Moreover, the norms, principles, rules and procedures of the regimes are
based on well-established and widely recognized international bodies of international
law (SAR 1979, IAMSAR). In practice, the issues the parties are seeking to come to
terms with are related to the complexity of the tasks and operational conditions
involved in conducting SAR operations in the Arctic. In the Arctic SAR regime, this
is related to putting in place the basic principles, rules and procedures for conducting
joint SAR operations. The exercises have identified a wide range of challenges,
indicating that the professional standards and procedures, platforms of communica-
tion, formal structures and more, are not yet coordinated and/or compatible to a
satisfactory extent. For the Barents SAR regime, the development of cooperation,
shared understandings and mutual expectations between responders at the agency
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level has been a major driving force. This is a result of shared professional standards
as well as more informal relations - as reflected by the informants. These relations
have developed gradually over time, and are not without complications. However,
they have become important in facilitating cooperation between the parties.
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